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Abstract
We conduct an empirical study of the e⁄ect of the accumulation of
pension funds ￿nancial assets on national saving. To do that we rely
on a panel of 43 countries including several developed and developing
countries. We ￿nd evidence suggesting that the accumulation of pen-
sion funds ￿nancial assets might increase national saving when these
funds are the result of a mandatory pension program. In contrast,
national saving might be una⁄ected when pension funds are the result
of a public program implemented to foster voluntary pension saving.
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This paper asks the following question: does the accumulation of pension
funds ￿nancial assets stimulate national saving? In other words, is the accu-
mulation of pension ￿nancial assets helpful to foster national saving?
Having an answer for this question might be useful for several reasons.
First, due to pervasive aging problems, several developed countries are debat-
ing reforms in their pay as you go pension systems. In fact, The Economist
(2004) alerts that a larger generation of old people will need support from
a population of young people that is shrinking continuously in absolute size.
One of the options available to face this fact is to reduce the role of the pay
as you go system and encourage funding. In that scenario, a careful under-
standing of the macroeconomic consequences of accumulating pension funds
might be of central interest.
Second, high saving rates typically go hand in hand with high and persis-
tent investment rates. It is well known that the accumulation of productive
factors is one of the key engines for a sustained growth process. In this
respect, an in￿ uential paper by Young (1995) even argues that behind the
famous East Asian ￿miracle￿there was no miracle at all: the key in achieving
per capita gdp annual growth rates averaging almost 7 percent in a span of
more than two decades was an impressive accumulation of productive factors.
If one were able to show that pension funds increase national saving, then
the design of pension regimes might have important policy implications.
In this paper we answer the above questions using regression analysis, by
relying on what we believe is the largest cross country time series data on pen-
sion funds ￿nancial assets constructed up to now. National saving regressions
2are estimated for a sample comprising 43 countries including both OECD
members and developing nations totalizing more than 400 observations. We
estimate our empirical equations using various panel data techniques to deal
with several important econometric issues such as: simultaneity and country
heterogeneity.
Although the main national saving determinant that we are focused on is
pension funds, a by-product of the paper is that we also consider other sav-
ing determinants. Thus, we present evidence related to questions repeatedly
tackled in the saving literature such as: Does income growth raise national
saving? Do higher interest rates lead to higher national saving? Does na-
tional saving vary with a country￿ s income level? Do demographic factors
in￿ uence national saving? Is there a terms of trade e⁄ect on national saving?
The main ￿nding of the paper is that the impact of pension funds depends
on whether these funds are mandatory or voluntary. More precisely, the
evidence suggests that increases in pension funds ￿nancial assets increase
national saving when pension funds are the result of a mandatory pension
program. In contrast, changes in pension funds ￿nancial assets do not have
a signi￿cant e⁄ect on national saving when pension funds are accumulated
in response to a public program designed to promote voluntary saving.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theo-
retical considerations that have to be taken into account when studying the
e⁄ects of pension funds on aggregate saving. Section 3 reviews some of the
existing empirical estimations. Section 4 presents econometric modeling is-
sues with a detailed explanation of the controls that will be used to identify
the e⁄ect of pension funds on national saving. Section 5 describes our data
3base and the sources employed. Section 6 reports the econometric methods
that were used to estimate the econometric model and the corresponding
results that were obtained. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
2.1 Individual level
The most useful framework to study the e⁄ect of mandatory pension pro-
grams on saving at a microeconomic level is the simple life cycle model that
is discussed in detail in, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). The
individual lives for two periods, in the ￿rst of which he/she earns a wage
from his/her ￿xed labor supply and in the second he/she is retired. He/she
saves from his wage income to provide for second period consumption with a
constant rate of interest (i.e., the rate of interest does not vary with his/her
level of saving).
The main insight that is obtained from the model is that of consumption
smoothing: the individual will save to transfer purchasing power to the stage
of his/her life in which he/she is retired.
The introduction of a mandatory pension program means that a tax falls
on wages in the ￿rst period to pay retirement bene￿ts in the second period.
Net pension wealth is simply de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the present
value of bene￿ts minus the value of contributions. As emphasized by Lieb-
man and Feldstein (2001), the value of net pension wealth plays a key role
in understanding the e⁄ect of a mandatory pension program on individual
saving.
4If net pension wealth is zero, the intertemporal budget constraint of the
individual does not change. The individual would reduce his/her ordinary
saving (i.e., saving in non-pension instruments) by exactly the same amount
of his/her pension contribution leaving his/her total saving unchanged. How-
ever, if net pension wealth is positive, the intertemporal budget constraint
is relaxed and consumption in each period would rise. The individual would
reduce his/her ordinary saving by more than the amount of his/her pension
contribution and thus, diminishing his/her total saving. Finally, if net pen-
sion wealth is negative, the intertemporal budget constraint is tightened and
consumption in each period would fall. The individual would reduce his/her
ordinary saving by less than the amount of his pension contribution, hence
his/her total saving would increase.
From the previous paragraph the reader might think that the saving re-
sponse (at a microeconomic level) to mandatory pension programs is com-
pletely determined by the value of net pension wealth. However, things be-
come more complicated if we relax the assumptions (some of them implicit)
of the simplest life cycle model that we made above. We will go through
several examples assuming that net pension wealth is zero or, equivalently,
examples in which ordinary saving should be reduced by the same amount
of pension contributions leaving total saving una⁄ected.
First, suppose that the mandatory pension program provides bene￿ts that
are larger than the level of consumption that is desired by the individual in
the second period of his/her life in the absence of the program. Suppose in
addition that there are borrowing constraints.1 If for some reason (e.g., lack
1Flemming (1973) o⁄ers one of the ￿rst formalizations of the life cycle model with
5of collateral) there are borrowing constraints, then the individual will reduce
his/her ordinary saving to zero. Note that the individual would like to reduce
his/her ordinary saving even further (i.e., to borrow) so as to restore his/her
desired level of future consumption but binding borrowing constraints do
not allow such response. The bottom line is that binding borrowing con-
straints result in ordinary saving falling by less than the amount of pension
contributions, hence total saving increases.
Second, suppose that the mandatory pension program induces the indi-
vidual to retire earlier than they would have as suggested by Feldstein (1974).
Saving during working years will have to be higher to ￿nance a longer retire-
ment. Again, ordinary saving will fall by less than the amount of pension
contributions, therefore, his/her total saving increases.
Third, imagine that workers save not only for consumption smoothing
motives but also for precautionary motives (e.g., extraordinary health expen-
ditures).2 Since pension wealth is highly illiquid, then it is a poor substitute
of precautionary wealth. In those circumstances, ordinary saving will fall by
less than the amount of pension contributions, therefore, total saving will
increase.
Fourth, suppose that an important driver of saving is that people want
to leave an inheritance to their children.3 Again, due to low substitutability,
ordinary saving will fall by less than the amount of pension contributions,
capital market imperfections (e.g., borrowing constraints).
2Carrol (1997), for example, presents survey evidence in which people predominantly
say that being prepared for emergencies is the most important reason for saving.
3In a famous study, Kotliko⁄ and Summers (1981) show that bequests account for a
substantial fraction of U.S. aggregate capital accumulation.
6then his/her total saving will increase.
Finally, consider an alternative approach to the fully rational life cycle
model. Thaler (1990) suggests that lots of people take consumption and
saving decisions following rules of thumb instead of following ￿ sophisticated￿
lifetime considerations. In those cases, ordinary saving will not be responsive
to pension contributions.
2.2 Aggregate level
We see that ￿guring out the e⁄ect of a mandatory pension program on saving
at a microeconomic level is not straightforward. Our previous discussion
showed that there are several possibilities depending on the assumptions
made. New di¢ culties appear when one wants to disentangle the e⁄ect of
a mandatory pension program on saving at a macroeconomic or aggregate
level. What we have to do is to sum the saving response of each individual but
taking into account that individual responses might vary due to di⁄erences
in preferences (e.g., di⁄erences in patience) or di⁄erences in opportunities
(e.g., di⁄erences in net pension wealth).
The most natural analytical framework to study the e⁄ect of mandatory
pension programs on aggregate saving is the overlapping generations model
with production due to Diamond (1965). In such a framework, each individ-
ual lives for just two periods. In the ￿rst of which he/she earns a wage from
his/her ￿xed labor supply and in the second he/she is retired. Second pe-
riod consumption is equal to capital accumulated and capital services (i.e.,
interest payments). At each date is born a cohort of individuals and the
population grows at a constant rate. Individuals in each cohort are identical
7and individuals across cohorts are identical except for their date of birth.
The economy has a single consumption good that must be produced from
capital and labor. Capital saved in one period becomes an input in the pro-
duction process of the following period and it is physically identical to the
consumption good. Individuals may be thought of as workers in youth and
entrepreneurs in old age.
The existence of capital as a store of value is what allows individuals
to carry purchasing power from the ￿rst period to the second period in the
aggregate (i.e., to save). Net borrowing will be zero in the aggregate.4
It should be emphasized that in the relatively simpler pure exchange ver-
sion of the overlapping generations model, as the one considered by Samuel-
son (1958), each individual lives for just two periods and has an endowment
of the non-storable consumption good in each period. There is no produc-
tion. The drawback of this version of the model is that aggregate saving is
necessarily equal to zero. Why? The members of a cohort might be eager
to trade present consumption for future consumption to smooth consump-
tion along the life cycle. However, if we assume that all the members of a
cohort are identical, then all members will try to do the same and individual
autarchy cannot be avoided.
Moreover, even if we relax the assumption of identical individuals among
the members of a generation by introducing di⁄erences in individual endow-
ments or di⁄erences in rates of time preference, aggregate borrowing/lending
cannot take place. In other words, although someone relatively more patient
4Intergenerational borrowing/lending is not possible because members of di⁄erent gen-
erations meet only once in a two period life cycle.
8lends to someone relatively more impatient, aggregate net lending will be
necessarily equal to zero. The individuals do not have a mean (e.g., capital,
durable goods, money, etc.) to carry purchasing power from the ￿rst period
to the second period in the aggregate.
Thus, given that there cannot be aggregate saving, studying the e⁄ects of
mandatory pension programs on aggregate saving in a pure exchange version
is not very useful. So we will next analyze the e⁄ect of mandatory pension
programs having in mind an overlapping generations model with production.
2.3 Fully funded programs
There are two polar ways to run a mandatory pension program. In a fully
funded program each worker makes contributions to a pension plan which
are invested (i.e., used to accumulate capital). The contributions of the
individuals when young are returned as capital when they are old.
A fully funded system forces each worker to save in an amount at least
equal to his/her mandatory saving contribution. If, in the absence of a
mandatory pension program, all individuals choose to save more than the
mandatory pension contribution then, a fully funded program will simply
replace ordinary saving by an equivalent amount of saving by the mandatory
pension program. In these special circumstances, the mandatory pension
program will be neutral with respect to total aggregate saving in the economy.
In contrast, if in the absence of a mandatory pension program all indi-
viduals choose to save less than the mandatory pension contribution, a fully
funded system will augment total aggregate saving in the economy. Ordi-
nary aggregate saving will be reduced to zero but total aggregate saving
9will increase. Note that each of the individuals would like to reduce his/her
ordinary saving even further (i.e., to borrow) when young but that cannot
happen in the aggregate. The individuals only have capital as a mean to
transfer purchasing power across time and capital holdings can be zero but
not negative.
2.4 Pay as you go programs
In a pay as you go program, young individuals contribute a fraction of their
wage to a pool of funds out of which the elderly draw pensions. The manda-
tory pension program does not invest the contributions since they are auto-
matically destined to the retirees. The rate of return of contributions is given
by the rate of growth of the labor force.5 With a pay as you go program in
operation, any e⁄ect that the existence of the program has upon ordinary
saving is re￿ ected in total saving since, by de￿nition, the program does not
save (i.e., accumulate capital).
To gauge the impact of a pay as you go pension program on saving one
has to realize, as clearly explained by Myles (1995), that it leads to an inter-
generational reallocation of resources/wealth.6 If we constraint ourselves to
the case where economies have ￿nite aggregate wealth, intergenerational re-
5The mandatory pension program pays a rate of return equal to the population growth
rate because in each period there are more people alive to make contributions to the pension
program. It should be remarked that in our analytical framework we are abstracting from
productivity growth.
6In contrast, a fully funded program leads only to an intertemporal reallocation for
each generation.
10allocations of wealth cannot be Pareto e¢ cient.7 In other words, an increase
in wealth of one generation comes at the expense of a reduction of wealth for
the rest of the generations.
The start up of a pay as you go program entails intergenerational transfers
by conceding a windfall to the members of the initial generation of bene￿-
ciaries of the system (who do not contribute) at the expense of later gener-
ations.8 Since old people have a higher propensity to consume than young
people, the increase in consumption of the initial generation of bene￿ciaries
will be higher than the fall in consumption of workers. Thus, aggregate or-
dinary saving will fall. It can be shown then that the impact of the start up
of a pay as you go program is to slow the rate of capital accumulation and
reduce the steady state capital stock.9 As Engen and Gale (1997) point out,
each expansion of the pay as you go program can be thought as a small start
up providing a windfall to those new bene￿ciaries of the system with little
or no previous contributions.
2.5 Regime change
A shift from a pay as you go to a fully funded system implies that contri-
butions made by the currently young generation no longer go to bene￿ts to
7Any in￿nite horizon economy in which resources grow faster than the rate of interest
has in￿nite wealth. Those economies are called dynamically ine¢ cient. In such scenario,
intergenerational transfers are Pareto e¢ cient. See Azariadis (1996) for more details.
8This dramatic simpli￿cation is a consequence of our two period analytical framework.
In the real world, one can think in terms of individuals who are at the end of their working
lifes, and contribute a small amount to the system while obtaining full retirement bene￿ts.
9See Azariadis (1996) for a formal proof.
11the currently old generation. Therefore, there is a transition cost (i.e., the
implicit debt of the pay as you go system) that someone has to bear and,
as stated by Engen and Gale (1997), there are no many options: either one
generation pays the cost or the cost is divided among several generations.
The option that is chosen will determine the impact of the regime change on
saving.
If the transition cost is allocated to individuals with higher propensity to
consume then saving will increase. For example, cutting bene￿ts to retirees
would reduce aggregate consumption more than in a scenario in which the
adjustment is ￿nanced by increasing taxes to workers because old people have
a higher propensity to consume than young people.
In the short run, the transition cost can also be ￿nanced by issuing gov-
ernment debt but at some point of time taxes will have to be increased to
service that debt. If that is the case, the transition cost will not be paid by
current retirees and saving will fall because current retirees probably have a
higher propensity to consume than current and future workers who will bear
the burden of current and future taxes.
As Samwick (1999) remarks, the intergenerational allocation of the tran-
sition cost is the most important consideration to determine the e⁄ect of
the regime change on saving. However, other factors may also be relevant.
If the regime change entails intragenerational distributions of wealth, then
saving might also change. In most cases, fully funded systems have fewer
redistributional objectives than pay as you go systems. Then, the regime
change implies transferring wealth from low income earners to high income
earners. If high income earners have higher propensities to save than low
12income earners, then saving goes up.10
2.6 Voluntary programs
The usual analytical framework used to study the e⁄ect of voluntary pension
programs is the same life cycle model that was used to study the e⁄ect of
mandatory pension programs.
Public policies promoting voluntary pension saving are almost always
modeled as a tax reduction that raises the e⁄ective real rate of interest.
Using the simple life cycle model we know that, on one hand, an increase in
the real interest rate makes present consumption relatively more expensive
and thus, induces an increase in saving. On the other hand, a higher real
interest rate means that each unit of forgone consumption is worth more units
of future consumption making the individual richer and therefore, induces a
fall in saving.
The total e⁄ect of an increase in the real interest rate will therefore depend
on the relative strength of the ￿rst e⁄ect (i.e., the substitution e⁄ect) versus
the second e⁄ect (i.e., the income e⁄ect).11
Following Besley and Meghir (1998), an alternative and probably more
accurate way to model public policies promoting voluntary pension saving is
to interpret them as the creation of tax favored assets where individuals can
invest in them up to a speci￿c limit. Additional saving has to be channeled
10Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2003) ￿nd a strong positive relationship between personal
saving rates and lifetime income. In other words, they ￿nd that rich people save more.
11If preferences are homothetic the total e⁄ect of an increase in the real interest rate
depends simply on whether the elasticity of substitution between consumption early in life
and later in life is greater or less than unity.
13through other non tax favored assets. In this alternative analytical frame-
work, Besley and Meghir shown that, even in the case where the total e⁄ect
of an increase in the real interest rate is positive, the creation of tax favored
assets will have an ambiguous e⁄ect on saving.
Another important issue that has to be taken into account when dealing
with voluntary pension programs is the presence of a ￿scal cost. Voluntary
pension programs are typically implemented by allowing tax exemptions to
pension fund holders. In other cases they only allow tax deferrals. The
bottom line is that, for a given amount of private saving, preferential tax
treatment imply lower tax revenues and thus, lower government saving.
3 Existing Evidence
The empirical studies estimating the e⁄ect of pensions on saving can be
divided in two groups. The ￿rst group analyses the case of pay as you
go schemes while the second group focuses on funded schemes. Each of
the groups can be subdivided in three categories depending on the type of
data employed to conduct the estimations: time series, cross section or cross
country.
We will next brie￿ y comment on a couple of well known papers in each
of the categories distinguished above. This is just to illustrate that the com-
parison of di⁄erent studies is not straightforward since they usually measure
di⁄erent things. Exhaustive reviews of the literature can be found in Con-
gressional Budget O¢ ce (1998) and in Kohl and O￿ Brien (1998).
143.1 Pay as you go-time series
Perhaps the most famous study in all the literature is Feldstein (1974). His
contribution was to extend the consumption function popularized by Ando
and Modigliani (1963) to include pension wealth as one of the key deter-
minants (the other determinants were permanent income and wealth). The
estimates shown in the paper are based on aggregate annual U.S. data and
a sample of almost 40 observations. Feldstein (1996) ran the same regres-
sions of the original paper adding 20 observations. After coping with some
autocorrelation issues, he obtained the following results (standard errors in
parenthesis):
C = 641 + :63
(:06)
Y D + :074
(:053)





where C denotes the value of real per capita consumption, Y D real per
capita disposable income, W real per capita personal wealth. The level of
disposable income in the previous year is included in an attempt to approx-
imate permanent income. The last variable is social security wealth, SSW,
that is de￿ned as the present value of retirement bene￿ts.12 What are the
implications of these estimates? In 1992, SSW was equal to $14,246 billion.
The fall in personal saving that could be accounted by pension wealth is
:028￿$14;246 ￿ = $400 billion. Moreover, in 1992, pension taxes were equal to
$279 billion. Then, the fall in personal saving that could be accounted by a
12The original paper also included a measure of corporate retained earning as one of the
determinants. Feldstein (1996) shows that the results remain almost invariant when this
variable is included.
15lower permanent income is :3￿$279 ￿ = $84 billion.13 Thus, the total e⁄ect of
the pay as you go program was to reduce personal saving by approximately
$484 billion. Since total personal saving in 1992 was $248 billion when it
could have been $732 billion (= $484 + $248), he concluded that the Social
Security Program reduced personal saving by 66 percent.
Barro (1978) claimed that Feldstein￿ s estimations were biased as a re-
sult of the omission of government saving as one of the determinants of the
consumption function. In fact, he showed that SSW was not statistically
signi￿cant when government saving was included in the regression. Another
important study was Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) who argued that Feldstein￿ s
￿ndings where highly sensible to the assumptions that he made to construct
the social security wealth variable. The use of reasonable alternative assump-
tions results in weaker estimates of the relationship between social security
and personal saving.
3.2 Pay as you go-cross section
Cross section studies using microeconomic data were basically motivated by
the small number of observations that where available when using aggregate
annual time series data. Feldstein and Pellechio (1979) derived from the
traditional life cycle model an equation in which the stock of accumulated
wealth is a function of labor income. More precisely, they estimated the
following equation:
13Note that :3 = 1￿(:63+:07) is the marginal propensity to save of permanent disposable
income.
16Ai = ￿0 + ￿1Y Li ￿ ￿SSWi + ￿3Y L
2
i + ui
where A denotes ordinary wealth, Y L denotes net of tax labor income in
the ￿nal preretirement year and SSW denotes social security wealth de￿ned
as the present value of retirement bene￿ts.
Note that ￿ measures the e⁄ect of the stock of pension wealth on the stock
of ordinary wealth. This should be taken into account when comparing the
results with time series studies that usually measure the e⁄ect of the stock
of pension wealth on the ￿ ow of saving. A value of ￿ = :66, for example,
would be consistent with the results obtained in Feldstein (1996).
The most pure life cycle model suggests that ￿ = 1 if net social security
wealth is equal to zero. Relaxing the assumptions of the pure life cycle model,
￿ can take any value from greater than unity to less than zero. Using The
Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers for 126 married couples,
the point estimates indicate that ￿ is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero but not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from one. In other words, the estimates generally show
that ￿ is somewhat less than unity.
By exploiting a sample of more than 2,000 observations obtained from
a series of surveys of male household heads aged 45-59 conducted by the
Bureau of Census, Kotliko⁄ (1979) used a similar econometric speci￿cation
to the one employed by Feldstein and Pellechio (1979). He also included
other controls in the regression such as: dummies for marriage, race, and
heads who are separated, widowed, or divorced, the head and the wife￿ s ages
and the square of their ages as well as the number of family members. His
results are in line with those that were obtained by Feldstein and Pellechio
17(1979).
3.3 Pay as you go-cross country
Saving rates di⁄er very substantially among countries.14 Modigliani (1970)
veri￿ed that the life cycle model was a useful vehicle to rationalize those
di⁄erences. In fact, the basic life cycle model predicts that fast growing
countries will have higher saving rates and that countries with a higher frac-
tion of working age population will also have higher saving rates.
Feldstein (1980) extended once again the work of Modigliani by including
into the analysis the role played by the varying retirement bene￿ts that are
provided by social security programs in di⁄erent countries. Using a sample
of 12 observations he arrived to the following results:












where S=Y is the private saving rate, G is the growth rate of total pri-
vate income, AGE is the ratio of the number of retirees over the age of 65
to the population aged 20 to 65, DEP is the ratio of the number of younger
dependents to the working age population, B=E is the bene￿ts-earnings re-
placement ratio, and LPAGED is the labor force participation rate of older
men.
According to the life cycle theory we know that once we control for retire-
ment (proxied by labor force participation of older people), higher retirement
14See Edwards (1996) for a relatively recent documentation of this fact.
18bene￿ts measured by the bene￿ts-earnings replacement ratio, B=E, reduce
the private saving rate. The results of the regression do not reject this hy-
pothesis.
Edwards (1996) works with a sample of 32 countries (including developed
and developing countries) and a panel of more than 200 observations to study
the determinants of private saving. Among them he includes a social security
variable that is de￿ned as the ratio of public expenditure on social security
and welfare to total public expenditures. In all the regressions presented
in his paper, the social security variable has a negative coe¢ cient that is
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
3.4 Funded programs-time series
In contrast to the implications of the life-cycle theory, two well known cross
sectional studies by Cagan (1965) and Katona (1965) have shown that em-
ployees covered by private pensions do not save less and may even save more
than employees not covered by private pensions. Cagan interpreted the re-
sults by saying that pension coverage showed the importance of saving for
retirement and saving could increase due to this ￿ recognition e⁄ect￿ . Katona
had a di⁄erent explanation for the phenomenon based on the idea that the
e⁄ort employed to achieve a goal increases when the distance to the goal de-
creases. In this case the goal would be an adequate retirement consumption.
Munnel (1976) obtained completely di⁄erent ￿ndings using a sample of
5,000 men who were between ages of 45 and 59 in 1996. In fact, she pre-
sented evidence showing that employees covered by private pensions save
substantially less than employees not covered by private pensions.
19The previous three studies were focused on the e⁄ects of private pensions
on personal saving but none of them considered the e⁄ects of private pensions
on aggregate private saving. Feldstein (1978) remarked that the net e⁄ect
of private pensions on private saving depended on three key issues: how do
employees covered by private pensions alter their ordinary saving, the amount
of anticipated pension bene￿ts that ￿rms e⁄ectively fund and the response
of shareholders to unfunded liabilities of their ￿rms.
Ideally one would like to measure these three responses separately. How-
ever, data limitations only allow an estimate of the aggregate response. Using
aggregate annual time series data for the U.S. and a sample with almost 40
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where SPRIV denotes per capita real private saving, Y D is per capita
real disposable income, W is the per capita real value of wealth, SSW is
social security wealth, RE is retained earnings of the ￿rms and SPEN is
pension saving.15
Given that the coe¢ cient of the pension saving variable is smaller than
the standard error, the hypothesis that private saving is not a⁄ected can-
not be rejected. One possible rationalization of this result is that employees
15Pension saving is measured as the increase in the book value of pension fund reserves
during the calendar year. These pension values are also adjusted to real dollars with
consumer price index and converted to per capita amounts.
20reduce their ordinary saving by the same amount of their contributions leav-
ing unchanged their total asset accumulation. At the same time, the ￿rm
uses the reduction on wages to ￿nance the pension fund without modifying
retained earnings. Thus, private saving remain unchanged.16
3.5 Funded programs-cross section
Hubbard (1986) used cross section data collected from a survey of the U.S.
President￿ s Commission on Pension Policy in 1979 with a sample of more than
3,000 observations. The estimates imply that an increase in social security
wealth of one dollar reduces ordinary wealth by thirty-three cents, while an
increase in private pension wealth of one dollar reduces ordinary wealth by
sixteen cents. Gale (1998) argues that most estimates of the e⁄ect of private
pensions on ordinary wealth are biased downwards.
3.6 Funded programs-cross country
Baillu and Reisen (1997) work with a sample of 10 countries and a panel of
more than 100 observations to study the determinants of private saving rates
in the same fashion as Edwards (1996). The purpose of their paper is to
study the e⁄ect of funded pension wealth as a determinant of private saving
rates. They ￿nd systematic evidence that funded pension wealth increases
private saving rates in developing countries with mandatory funded pension
programs.
16Even if the ￿rm uses the reduction in wages to distribute dividends instead of ￿nancing
the pension fund, the shareholders can save those additional dividends leaving aggregate
saving unchanged.
214 Econometric Modeling
We will adopt a reduced form approach encompassing a variety of saving
determinants identi￿ed in the saving literature instead of deriving a narrow
model of consumption/saving decisions from ￿rst principles. This approach
is followed by several papers in the cross country saving literature such as
Edwards (1996), Masson, Bayoumi and Samiei (1998), and Loayza, Schmidt
Hebbel and Serven (2000). However, our main focus will not be on all saving
determinants but on pension saving.
The dependent variable will be the national saving rate, nsr. The deter-
minant of our interest is the pension saving rate, psr.
An important remark has to do with the choice of our dependent vari-
able, the national saving rate. We could have chosen the private saving rate
instead and also include the government saving rate as one of the private
saving determinants. Nevertheless, following that path would have been as-
sociated with several measurement problems. For example, private saving is
usually overestimated in the national accounts because it is not adjusted for
the in￿ ation tax su⁄ered by money and nominal bond holders; the opposite
happens with government saving measures. Another important measurement
problem is that available government statistics do not correspond to the same
level of government for each of the countries. Depending on the country, The
Government Financial Statistics publishes data corresponding to the general
government, the consolidated central government, or the budgetary central
government. These problems do not appear when we work with the national
saving rate.
As clearly explained by Loayza, Schmidt Hebbel and Serven (2000), when
22we use the same determinants for national saving rates and private saving
rates we are assuming that public saving is determined by the same variables
that determine private saving. This is a standard practice given that there
is almost no theoretical work trying to explain the behavior of government
saving.
Following the cross country saving literature we consider the following
controls:
￿ old dependency ratio, odr. Following the life cycle model of consump-
tion and saving of Ando and Modigliani (1963) we know that saving
behavior changes dramatically in the di⁄erent stages of the life cycle.
For example, when people reach retirement, their labor income van-
ishes and they start to dissave. Therefore, we interpret a relatively
high value of odr as an economy with a relatively high proportion of
dissavers relative to savers. Naturally, we expect a negative coe¢ cient
for odr.
￿ young dependency ratio, ydr. As with odr we also expect a negative
coe¢ cient. Le⁄(1969) was the ￿rst paper documenting the relationship
between national saving rates and dependency rates using a sample of
74 countries. He said that children represent a heavy charge to expen-
diture which in national accounts enter under the heading of consump-
tion. Because they contribute to consumption but not to production,
a high ratio of dependents to the working age population might be
expected to impose a constraint on a society￿ s potential for saving.
￿ urbanization ratio, ur. If people have a precautionary motive for sav-
23ing, we would expect that those who face more uncertainty will save
more. In the aggregate, countries relying heavily on agriculture will be
exposed to more climate uncertainty. Since a higher urbanization ratio
is associated with a lower predominance of agricultural activities we
would expect a negative coe¢ cient for ur. A di⁄erent interpretation is
discussed below.
￿ terms of trade, tot. An old proposition in open macroeconomics is that
an improvement in terms of trade results in an increase in saving. This
idea is associated to the names of Harberger, Laursen and Metzler since
the early 1950s. The logic of the proposition goes as follows. An im-
provement in the terms of trade raises a country￿ s real income level,
measured as the purchasing power of its exports in world markets, and
hence, on the assumption that the marginal propensity to consume is
less than unity, raises saving. The theoretical proposition was revisited
and quali￿ed by Svensson and Razin (1983) and many others.17 Os-
try and Reinhart (1992) show some empirical evidence for developing
countries.
￿ income, gdp. In a scenario where subsistence considerations are per-
vasive there is little margin for saving considerations. See Rebelo
(1992) for a model in which subsistence considerations play a role in
consumption-saving decisions. Thus, we expect a positive coe¢ cient
for gdp.
17Svensson and Razin emphasized that a distinction has to be made between temporary
and permanent terms of trade shocks. Only temporary terms of trade shocks had an e⁄ect
on saving.
24￿ income growth, growth. In a stagnant economy, saving of active people
is compensated by dissaving of passive people. In contrast, in a growing
economy, saving of active people more than compensates dissaving of
passive people. Thus, we expect a positive coe¢ cient for growth.
￿ real interest rate, r. An increase in the real interest rate will a⁄ect
individual saving through two di⁄erent forces that work in opposite
directions. On one hand, it will make present consumption more ex-
pensive inducing an increase in saving. On the other hand, it will make
possible the transformation of a given amount of present consumption
into more units of future consumption inducing a fall in saving. In
addition, there is no easy answer on the way in which an increase in
the real interest rate will a⁄ect government and/or ￿rms saving.18
￿ in￿ ation, ￿. In￿ ation has an ambiguous e⁄ect on saving. Higher in-
￿ ation is associated to higher macro uncertainty that could stimulate
precautionary saving.19 At the same time, higher in￿ ation induces a
substitution away from ￿nancial assets due to a lower real return.
￿ ￿nancial deepening, fd. It intends to capture a measure of the vehicles
available to save. Better functioning ￿nancial markets might foster
saving. Thus, the expected coe¢ cient is positive.
￿ foreign saving ratio, fsr. In a world with perfect capital mobility across
countries, foreign saving would be a result of national saving and not
18Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart (1996) quantify empirically the response of consump-
tion/saving to changes in the real rate of interest.
19Risk-averse households will react to increased uncertainty by increasing their saving.
25a determinant. However, the world is more accurately characterized
by scenarios where foreign borrowing is rationed. The expected sign of
the coe¢ cient is negative. According to Rahman (1968), an increase
in foreign funds causes a relaxation of government saving and thus a
reduction of the national saving rate.
￿ social expenditure ratio, ser. Using the life cycle model we know that
higher retirement bene￿ts reduce saving needs. The expected coe¢ -
cient is negative.
5 Data and Sources
Our data set comprises a maximum of 43 countries and spans the years 1960-
2002. This panel data set is heavily unbalanced since the number of time
series observations di⁄ers considerably across countries.
The dependent variable in our regressions will be the national saving
rate, nsr. Following Loayza, Lopez, Schmidt Hebbel and Serven (1998), nsr
is de￿ned as the ratio between gross national saving, gns, and gross national
disposable income, gndi.
Gross national disposable income, gndi, is de￿ned as gross national in-
come, gni, plus current transfers from abroad, tr. Gross national income,
gni, is de￿ned as gross domestic product, gdp, plus net factor payments from
abroad, nfpa.20 Gross national saving, gns, is equal to the di⁄erence be-
20All gdp estimates are based on the production approach. There usually exists a dis-
crepancy between gdp estimates based on the production approach and gdp estimates
based on the expenditure approach.
26tween gndi and total consumption, tc. Total consumption, tc, is the sum of
household ￿nal consumption expenditure, hc, and general government ￿nal
consumption expenditure, te.21 All the variables are measured in local cur-
rency at current prices. The source used to obtain annual time series of each
of the variables was The World Development Indicators.22
The main determinant of our interest is the pension saving rate, psr. It is
de￿ned as the ratio between pension saving, ps, and gross national disposable
income, gndi. Pension saving is de￿ned as the change in the value of ￿nancial
assets of pension funds, pa. Annual time series showing the evolution of
pension assets were basically obtained from national sources and from The
Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook.23
Following Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2003) we divide the countries
between two groups. The ￿rst group comprises the countries in which our
data on pension assets are predominantly (i.e., more than 50 percent) the re-
sult of mandatory funded pension programs. The second group includes the
countries in which our data on pension assets are predominantly the result of
voluntary funded pension programs. In the ￿rst group we have: Argentina,
Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary,
India, Jordan, Kazkhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Singapore and Uruguay. In the second group we have:
21Total consumption includes the statistical discrepancy that results from estimating
gdp using the expenditure and output approach.
22All the series were downloaded electronically through the World Bank￿ s internal data-
base system, SIMA.
23A separate appendix describes in detail the length of each of the annual time series
obtained and the corresponding source.
27Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fin-
land, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States.
It should be remarked that our database includes some cases that deserve
comment. For example, it includes Australia for which we obtained pension
assets time series corresponding to the sum of both mandatory and voluntary
pensions but we could not ￿nd separate series for each of them. It also
includes countries such as Japan, Canada, Korea, Philippines and Panama
for which we found just a fraction of pension assets. Finally, it also includes
the case of Netherlands. Although we consider it voluntary because there is
no legislation on the contrary, some people consider it mandatory because
pension plans are the result of collective labor agreements.
The old dependency ratio, odr, is de￿ned as the number of people older
than 65, op, divided by the number of people in working age (people older
than 15 and younger than 65), mp. The young dependency ratio, ydr, is
de￿ned as the number of people younger than 15, yp, divided by the number
of people in working age, mp. The urbanization ratio, ur, is de￿ned as
the ratio between the number of people living in urban areas, up, and total
population, tp. Annual time series of each of the variables were obtained
from The World Development Indicators.
The terms of trade, tot, is an index that shows the national accounts
exports price index divided by the imports price index, with 1995 as base
year. Annual time series of tot for each country were obtained from The
World Development Indicators.
Per capita gdp, pcgdp, is de￿ned as per capita gdp at constant prices
28measured in dollars of 1995. gdp growth, growth, is de￿ned as real per
capita gdp growth rate. The real interest rate, r, is the lending rate adjusted
for the rate of growth of the gdp de￿ ator. In￿ ation, inf, is measured as the
growth rate in the consumer price index. Annual time series of each of the
variables were obtained from The World Development Indicators.
Financial deepening, fd, is de￿ned as time and saving deposits, tsd,
divided by gross national disposable income, gndi. Edwards (1996) uses
M2/GDP for this variable. In our case we cannot use that variable because
M2 is no longer a meaningful concept in euro countries.24 The foreign saving
ratio, fsr, is de￿ned as foreign saving (i.e., minus the current account, ca)
divided by gross national disposable income, gndi. Annual time series of each
of the variables were obtained from The World Development Indicators.
The social expenditure ratio, ser, is de￿ned as social expenditure, se,
divided by gross national disposable income, gndi. Annual time series of
social expenditure were obtained from The Government Financial Statistics.
We will start our empirical analysis of the e⁄ects of pension saving on
national saving by running a simple regression model exploiting both cross
country and time variability. The total number of observations is 472. The






These results suggest show that there is a negative correlation between
national saving and pension saving but it is not statistically signi￿cant.
24The reason is that currency, a component of M2, cannot longer be associated to a
particular country.
29Given that our sample includes countries with mandatory funded pension
programs and countries with voluntary funded pension programs, it might
be useful to run separate regressions for each group of countries to verify
if there is any qualitative di⁄erence between both group of countries. The
total number of observations for countries with mandatory funded pension






We see that there is a positive correlation between nsr and psr that is sta-
tistically signi￿cant. The total number of observations for countries with







We now see that there is a negative correlation between nsr and psr that
is also statistically signi￿cant.
Table 1 shows sample statistics for all the variables that will be used in the
regressions for the countries where pension funds are the result of a voluntary
program. Table 2 shows sample statistics for countries where pension funds
are the result of a mandatory program. Note that demographic features di⁄er
substantially between both groups of countries. Moreover, national saving
rates are much more volatile for countries where pension funds are the result
of a mandatory program.
Table 3 shows the matrix of simple correlations for the countries where
pension funds are the result of a voluntary program. Table 4 shows sample
30statistics for countries where pension funds are the result of a mandatory pro-
gram. While the urbanization ratio is negatively related with national saving
rates for countries where pension funds are the result of a voluntary program,
the opposite happens when we consider countries where pension funds are
the result of a mandatory program. We also see that several variables have
high correlations among each other which means that multicolinearity issues
might be an important obstacle to do statistical inference.
6 Methods and Results
We know that a simple correlation between two variables never represents
compelling evidence to infer causality between those variables. So our ￿rst
step to disentangle the e⁄ect of pension saving on national saving, on a ceteris
paribus sense, will be to control for other national saving determinants that
are usually considered in the saving literature.
The natural starting point to do regression analysis is to pool the time
series corresponding to each country and estimate the following regression
using ordinary least squares, OLS:
nsr = ￿ + ￿psr + ￿X
where ￿ is a row vector of coe¢ cients and X is a column vector of controls.
The results of this ￿rst regression, R1, are shown in Table 5. We see that
pension saving decreases national saving when we hold other national saving
determinants constant. We also see that the rest of the coe¢ cients have the
signs that were expected.
31The next step is to introduce more ￿ exibility in our estimates and run
a regression in which we allow a di⁄erent slope and a di⁄erent intercept for
the case of countries that have a mandatory funded pension program. To do
that we create a new variable, m, that takes a unitary value if the country
has a mandatory funded pension program and takes a zero if the country
has a voluntary funded pension program. We then estimate the following
regression:
nsr = ￿0 + ￿1m + ￿0psr + ￿1(psr ￿ m) + ￿X
where ￿0 denotes the intercept of countries with a voluntary funded pen-
sion program, (￿0 +￿1) denotes the intercept of countries with a mandatory
funded pension program, ￿0 denotes the e⁄ect of an increase in pension sav-
ing on national saving for countries with a voluntary funded pension program
and (￿0 + ￿1) denotes the same e⁄ect but for the case of countries with a
mandatory funded pension program.
The results of this second regression, R2, are shown in Table 5. We
verify that mandatory funded pension saving results in an increase of national
saving of approximately the same magnitude (i.e., ￿0 + ￿1 = 1:08). This
suggests that there is not much substitution between mandatory pension
saving and ordinary saving.
In contrast, voluntary funded pension saving end up in a decrease of
national saving. At ￿rst glance this is hard to rationalize because it means
that voluntary funded pension saving is substituted away by more than 100%.
One possible rationalization of this phenomenon is that a full o⁄set of pension
saving by adjusting ordinary saving generates a fall in ￿scal revenues. In fact,
32voluntary pension funds are typically subject to a special tax treatment. If
that is the case, the portfolio reallocation (with no change in private saving)
results in a fall in government and national saving.25
Now we estimate the previous regression, R2, including ser as one of the
regressors. The results of this third regression, R3, are shown in Table 5.
The reason for presenting two regressions that are identical except for one
variable is that this variable is associated to a loss of 121 observations. We
do not like to lose observations due to other variables other than our main
variable of interest (i.e., pension saving).
We can check that almost non of the qualitative results change indicat-
ing that our previous estimates are quite robust. The only exception is the
in￿ ation rate that becomes signi￿cant at a 10 percent level. The social ex-
penditure variable has the sign that was expected.
To reinforce the result that voluntary saving incentives do not increase
national saving we add the insurance saving ratio, isr, as a new regressor in
R4. The new variable is de￿ned as the change in the value of the ￿nancial
assets reserves, ia, from the insurance companies divided by gross national
disposable income.26 The results of this new regression show that insurance
saving is not statistically signi￿cant and this is in line with our previous
25We run the same regression leaving Australia out of the sample and none of the results
change. We also run the same regression considering both Australia and Netherlands as
mandatory and the results remain almost invariant.
26Ideally, we should have used changes in reserves of life insurance companies (who are
the providers of long term saving instruments) but data limitations forced us to use data
for all type of insurances instead. The sources of this variable are speci￿ed in the same
appendix where we specify the sources of pension assets.
33￿ndings. There no major changes with the rest of the variables.
One typical objection made to regressions like R2, is that when they
include several controls, they are still leaving aside unobserved heterogeneity
in the form of time speci￿c e⁄ects and country speci￿c e⁄ects. To cope with
that unobserved heterogeneity we next include year dummies and country
dummies.27 The estimated equation is:
nsrit = ￿0 + ￿1m + ￿0psrit + ￿1(psr ￿ m) + ￿izi + ￿tt + ￿X
where zi is a variable that takes a unitary value for country i and a value
of zero otherwise, and t denotes the value of calendar time.
The results of this ￿fth regression, R5, are shown in Table 5. We see that
the young dependency ratio, the urbanization ratio, the real interest rate and
time and saving deposits ratio are no longer signi￿cant, but the in￿ ation rate
is signi￿cant and positive. The per capita gdp level is signi￿cant at a 10%
level. Other interesting features of the regression are that voluntary funded
pension saving is no longer signi￿cant while mandatory funded pension saving
is still signi￿cant and with the expected sign. However, the value of the
estimated coe¢ cient of psr:m suggests a substantial substitution between
mandatory funded pension saving and ordinary saving that was not captured
in R2.
Another problem with regression R2 not addressed in R5 is that some
of the controls that we have included might be simultaneously determined
27Our database for Panama, Japan, Canada, Korea and Philippines did not cover the
whole universe of pension assets as it does for the rest of the countries. This is an unob-
served heterogeneity and is captured by each country dummy.
34with national saving. In fact, per capita gdp growth, the real interest rate
and foreign saving are usually considered endogenous variables. In that case,
OLS estimators are neither unbiased nor consistent.
The most common strategy to deal with this problem is to adopt an
instrumental variables, IV, approach to conduct the estimations. We will
instrument for each of the potentially endogenous variables (i.e., r, fsr and
growth) using the ￿rst lag of each variable as instrument. Moreover, we will
include country dummies and year dummies. The estimated equation using
two stage least squares, 2SLS, is R6 and is shown in Table 5.
In comparison with R5 we now have that the old dependency ratio and
the in￿ ation rate are no longer signi￿cant. However, ￿nancial deepening is
now signi￿cant. Again, voluntary funded pension saving continues being non
signi￿cant while mandatory funded pension saving remains signi￿cant and
positive. The value of the estimated coe¢ cient of psr:m suggests a slightly
smaller substitution than the one that we saw in R5.
Finally, we will estimate a model in which we allow for dynamics by in-
troducing lags of the explained variable as one of the regressors. The model
includes a country speci￿c e⁄ect and year dummies. To conduct the estima-
tion we will follow the generalized method of moments, GMM, methodology
pioneered by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Each of the regressors might be classi￿ed as strictly exogenous, predeter-
mined or endogenous. We take all regressors as strictly exogenous with the
exception of nsr￿1, r, fsr and growth that are considered endogenous. To
allow for a richer dynamic structure we also include r￿1, fsr￿1 and growth￿1
as additional regressors.
35Ideally we should use the two-step GMM estimator because it is more
e¢ cient when the size of the sample is arbitrarily large. However, Arellano
and Bond (1991) recommend using the one-step results for inference on the
coe¢ cients. Several studies have found that two step standard errors tend to
be biased downwards in small samples. For this reason, the one-step results
are generally recommended for inference.
The results of this fourth regression, R7, are shown in Table 5. We can
see that demographic variables are not statistically signi￿cant and the same
happens with the real interest rate, the in￿ ation rate and time and saving
deposits ratio. All the remaining variables are statistically signi￿cant and
have the expected signs. The only exception is the urbanization ratio that
has a positive sign. As said above, previous studies suggest that its sign
should be negative.
One possible explanation for this outcome is that the urbanization process
is associated to a weakening of the family contract under which sons take
care of their parents when they are old. If that is the case, the expected sign
should no longer be negative. The regression suggests that saving history,
captured by lagsr, is a key determinant of nsr as we can see from the value of
the coe¢ cient. In relation to our main variable of interest psr, we have that
voluntary funded pension saving is not signi￿cant and the opposite happens
with mandatory funded pension saving. Moreover, the value of the coe¢ cient
is in line with our previous regressions since in the long run its value would
be :22=:3 = :73.
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the model is correctly speci￿ed. In
fact, the p-value of the Sargan speci￿cation test is 0.43. As Arellano and
36Bond (1991) emphasize, the presence of ￿rst-order autocorrelation in the
di⁄erenced residuals does not imply that the estimates are inconsistent, but
the presence of second-order autocorrelation would imply that the estimates
are inconsistent. Fortunately, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no second
order autocorrelation since the p-value of the relevant z statistic is 0.72.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we raised the hypothesis that pension saving might stimu-
late national saving. Using an unbalanced panel of 43 countries we found
evidence suggesting that pension saving increases national saving when pen-
sion saving is mandatory. Moreover, we found that each additional dollar of
mandatory pension saving increased national saving by more than 50 percent
of the increase in mandatory pension saving. We also encountered evidence
suggesting that voluntary pension saving (either in the form of pension sav-
ing or in the form of insurance saving) does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on
national saving.
Which is the mechanism through which mandatory pension saving might
foster national saving? First, the development of pension saving schemes, or
contractual saving in general, generate a better functioning of capital mar-
kets that may itself contribute to higher saving. Second, a funded system
with more direct link between contributions and bene￿ts may also increase
saving by generating awareness of the importance of saving. Third, individ-
uals might consider mandatory pension saving as an imperfect substitute of
ordinary saving due to liquidity considerations. In fact, pension bene￿ts are
37received as an annuity and not as a ￿xed sum at retirement and thus, has
lower liquidity. Fourth, individuals might consider mandatory pension sav-
ing and ordinary saving as perfect substitutes but many individuals might
be forced to accumulate more assets than they would otherwise choose to do
and have trouble to o⁄set pension accumulation (e.g., borrowing constraints).
Finally, individuals might follow rules of thumb to decide their levels of ordi-
nary saving that are una⁄ected by forced saving and therefore increase total
saving.
We would like to close by saying that the fact that we found that manda-
tory contribution to funded pension plans increase national saving does not
imply that we suggest that the contribution rate should be considered as a
policy instrument to increase national saving. The contribution rate to a
mandatory saving plan should be determined by the desired policy decision
to secure a minimum replacement rate at retirement (i.e., to prevent old age
poverty of the working population).
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43Table 1: Voluntary Programs
Summary Statistics for Saving Determinants
25th 75th
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. percentile percentile
nsr 0.22 0.2 0.05 0.17 0.25
psr 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.003 0.06
odr 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.1 0.19
ydr 0.4 0.33 0.17 0.28 0.43
ur 0.79 0.83 0.14 0.74 0.88
tot 101.15 100.17 7.67 98.08 102.65
gdp 21,871 23,130 9,071.14 18,149 27,647
growth 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.007 0.03
r 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08
inf 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.05
fd 0.38 0.36 0.16 0.27 0.45
fsr 0.005 0.009 0.03 -0.02 0.03
ser 0.17 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.21
Table 2: Mandatory programs
Summary Statistics for Saving Determinants
25th 75th
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. percentile percentile
nsr 0.24 0.21 0.11 0.14 0.27
psr 0.03 0.019 0.028 0.01 0.049
odr 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.101
ydr 0.53 0.51 0.19 0.42 0.66
ur 0.71 0.74 0.2 0.56 0.86
tot 97.71 98.31 9.78 92.31 102.57
gdp 5,891.56 3,488.70 6,688.55 2,048.60 5,543.10
growth 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.002 0.05
r 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.04 0.12
inf 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.1
fd 0.39 0.32 0.19 0.25 0.53
fsr 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.0003 0.04
ser 0.12 0.1 0.05 0.08 0.14
44Table 3
Cross correlations: voluntary programs
nsr psr odr ydr ur tot gdp growth r inf fd fsr ser
nsr 1
psr -0.39 1
odr -0.61 0.06 1
ydr 0.46 -0.11 -0.84 1
ur -0.38 0.25 0.5 -0.38 1
tot 0.24 -0.01 -0.31 0.49 -0.11 1
gdp -0.14 -0.11 -0.1 0.05 -0.06 -0.05 1
growth 0.05 0.1 0.11 -0.26 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 1
r -0.3 0.09 0.09 -0.15 -0.18 -0.09 0.09 0.03 1
inf -0.02 0.18 -0.08 0.1 0.07 0.05 -0.31 0.22 0.26 1
fd 0.52 -0.14 -0.35 0.24 -0.36 0.03 -0.14 0.03 -0.06 -0.15 1
fsr -0.16 -0 0.42 -0.11 0.51 0.05 -0.13 0.17 -0.37 -0.08 -0.26 1
ser -0.18 0.04 0.4 -0.28 0.59 -0.07 0.03 0.22 -0.35 -0.11 -0.31 -0.62 1
Table 4
Cross correlations: mandatory programs
nsr psr odr ydr ur tot gdp growth r inf fd fsr ser
nsr 1
psr 0.39 1
odr -0.2 -0.23 1
ydr -0.16 0.03 -0.62 1
ur 0.25 0.3 0.18 -0.58 1
tot 0.35 -0.26 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 1
gdp -0.49 -0.16 0.18 -0.03 0.19 -0.12 1
growth0.73 0.26 -0.25 -0.01 0.34 0.21 -0.19 1
r -0.73 -0.11 0.12 0.32 -0.34 -0.25 0.25 0.6 1
inf -0.41 -0.03 0.18 -0.16 -0.13 -0.43 0.1 0.5 0.37 1
fd 0.38 0.21 -0.08 0.03 -0.06 0.1 -0.48 0.11 -0.02 0.04 1
fsr 0.74 0.2 0.09 -0.56 0.66 0.23 -0.14 0.64 -0.77 -0.34 0.1 1
ser -0.43 -0.01 0.62 -0.3 0.25 -0.37 0.39 0.21 0.38 0.4 -0.17 -0.15 1
45Table 5: Panel Regressions Results
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7
psr -0.13 -0.37 -0.53 -0.52 -0.01 0.01 0.01
[-2.16] [-6.11] [-6.77] [-5.82] [0.31] [0.19] [.64]
odr -0.54 -0.61 -0.54 -0.47 -0.26 -0.13 -0.04
[-8.12] [-10.30] [-6.91] [-4.87] [-2.55] [-0.87] [-0.85]
ydr -0.07 -0.12 -0.1 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 0.004
[-3.10] [-5.97] [-4.39] [-2.03] [-0.82] [-1.39] [0.31]
ur -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.11 -0.06 0.13
[-1.17] [-4.1] [-2.11] [-1.34] [1.20] [-.43] [2.63]
tot 0.0009 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0008 0.0004
[3.66] [6.67] [5.68] [3.19] [7.41] [2.81] [4.03]
pcgdp 0.000001 0.000002 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.0000004 0.000001
[4.17] [6.71] [3.88] [2.46] [1.72] [0.25] [3.46]
growth 0.71 0.59 0.58 0.62 0.3 1.06 0.25
[9.31] [8.67] [7.14] [6.48] [6.51] [4.34] [9.60]
r -0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.12 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01
[2.70] [-2.75] [-3.67] [-3.57] [-0.9] [-0.34] [-.81]
inf 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.01
[1.11] [1.23] [1.65] [1.47] [3.95] [1.52] [1.28]
fd 0.1 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.006 0.05 0.004
[8.32] [7.96] [7.82] [7.91] [.52] [2.18] [0.67]
fsr -0.71 -0.6 -0.57 -0.61 -0.41 -0.23 -0.45





psr*m 1.45 1.55 1.18 0.58 0.64 0.22
[10.48] [9.47] [5.81] [4.84] [3.81] [4.03]
lagnsr 0.7
[29.32]
R-squared 0.65 0.73 0.76 0.69 0.92 0.85
Observ. 445 445 324 269 445 438 358
Note: t statistics go between brackets 46